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THE POWER OF THE DENVER WATER BOARD
TO ENACT PENALTY REGULATIONS
GEORGE GIBSON*

Due to an unusually small amount of precipitation in Colorado
during the past year, and having in mind the conservation of
water resources available for use in Denver, the Board of Water
Commissioners, pursuant to the Charter of the City and County
of Denver, promulgated a regulation to the effect that the residents of Denver may use water for irrigating purposes only during certain hours on certain days of the week. The regulation
further provides that, "use of water contrary to the rules and
regulations of the Board" will subject the occupant of the premises to a warning for the first violation, a five dollar "special
charge" for the second, $25 for the third, and, "If further misuse
occurs, similar procedures shall be followed but thereafter the
special charge shall be one hundred dollars ($100) on each occasion of misuse."' While that part of the regulation which limits
the hours of irrigation seems to be within the authority granted
to the Water Board by the Charter, it is submitted that the Board
is without authority to penalize for the violation of its regulations.
AUTHORITY GRANTED THE WATER BOARD BY THE CHARTER

Article XX of the Colorado Constitution vests the legislative
power, in matters of local concern, in the people of Denver.2 The
people of Denver in turn, have vested the legislative power, with
reservation, in the City Council.3 By amendment to the Charter
in 1918, the people of Denver created the Board of Water Commissioners and granted it certain specific authority. 4 It is necessary to examine that grant in detail:
The board shall have and exercise all powers given
to the public utilities commission of the city and county
of Denver and its successors by article XIX of the charter, as amended to May 17, 1916, and as amended by
section 264C adopted May 15, 1917, and not inconsistent with the provisions of this amendment.
This portion has the effect of withdrawing whatever power was
granted to the Public Utilities Commission and vesting it in the
new Water Board. Turning to Article XIX of the Charter to
determine the scope of the authority previously given to the Public Utilities Commission, we find:
Said commission shall . . . fix and collect all rates
and charges for any service under its control, which
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.

'Denver Post, June 25, 1954, p. 1.
2 Colo. Const. Art. XX, § 5 and 6; Speer v. People, 52 Colo. 325.
'Denver Charter Art. XIV, § 18 (Speer Amendment-May 17, 1916).
4 Charter Art. XIX § 297B.
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rates and charges shall be made as low as good service
will permit. Said commission may adopt reasonable rules
and regulations with reference to such service . . . Said
commission shall have and exercise all the powers of the
city and county granted in the constitution or named in
the charter in the matter of constructing, purchasing,
condemning and purchasing, acquiring, leasing, adding
to, maintaining, conducting and operating a water plant
or system for all uses and purposes and everything pertaining or deemed necessary or incidental thereto.
Again we are referred back-this time to Article XX of the Constitution. What powers did Article XX give to the City and
County of Denver "in the matter of constructing, purchasing"
etc. a water system? Quoting from Section 1 of Article XX:
...said corporation . . . shall have the power, within
or without its territorial limits, to construct, condemn
and purchase, acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct
and operate, water works, light plants, power plants,
transportation systems, heating plants, and any other
public utilities or works or ways local in use and extent,
in whole or in part, and everything required therefor,
for the use of said city and county and the inhabitants
thereof . . . and shall have the power to issue bonds upon
the vote of the taxpaying electors, at any special or general election, in any amount necessary to carry out any
of said powers or purposes, as may by the charter be
provided.
Thus, the authority previously granted to the Public Utilities
Commission and by amendment transferred to the Water Board
is the authority to fix rates, make reasonable rules and regulations, and the constitutional authority to conduct and operate a
water system.
The next grant of authority to the Water Board is a restatement of the constitutional and Charter (Article XIX) authority
given to acquire, conduct, operate, etc. a water works system and
everything incidental thereto:
The board shall have and exercise all the powers of
the city and county granted by the constitution and laws
of the state of Colorado and by the charter, in the matter of purchasing, condemning and purchasing, acquiring, constructing, leasing, extending and adding to, maintaining, conducting and operating a water works system
and plant for all uses and purposes, and everything necessary, pertaining or incidental thereto.
It is under this provision of the Charter that the Water Board
believes it has the power to penalize. 5
3 Conference with Mr. Glenn G. Saunders, Counsel for the Water Board, August 4, 1954.
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Next comes the Charter authority to fix rates and provide
rules and regulations, with specific authority to penalize for nonpayment or late payment of bills:
• .. It shall fix the rates for which water shall be furnished for all purposes, and shall provide rules and regulations relative to the use and distribution thereof. All
water rates shall be uniform as far as practicable, and
as low as good service will permit, and after the bonded
indebtedness is paid shall be no more than necessary to
cover the cost of operation, maintenance, additions, extensions and betterments. The board shall provide for
the payment of water rates in advance, at least twice
yearly, and shall provide penalties for failure to pay
promptly and for non-payment.
The Water Board is of the opinion that it is on a par with
the City Council: that it is given all of the powers of the City
and County of Denver which might be used in connection with
operating a water system. 6 The Board feels that the legislative
powers given to the City Council by the Speer Amendment were
withdrawn and vested in the Water Board insofar as they may
be exercised in the operation of the water system. It interprets
the words "all of the powers of the city and county granted by
the constitution and laws of the state of Colorado and by the
charter, in the matter of purchasing .... conducting and operating
a water works system . . . " as all the powers granted to the
people of Denver by the Constitution and to the city government
through the Charter which the Board might be able to use in
operating the water system. The Board evidently overlooks the
phrase "in the matter of".
The proper meaning of the grant is, all powers granted to
Denver related to or pertaining to or mentioning the operation
of a water system. This would include Section 1 of Article XX of
the Constitution, whatever state laws permit local control of
water, and the authorization given in Article XIX of the Charter
to acquire and operate a water system.
If the provision of the Charter giving all powers meant general legislative power, there would be no purpose in the grant
of authority to fix rates and make rules and regulations because
these would be included in general legislative power. Nor would
the provision authorizing the assessment of penalties for nonpayment of water bills be of any importance because the power
to initiate penalties is a legislative power and would be included
in the general grant of legislative power.
The City Council evidently believed that the Water Board
was without authority to make penal regulations, i.e., does not
have general legislative powers, when it declared that any use of
water in violation of the Board's regulations would "be conclu6

Ibid.
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sively presumed to be wasteful and in violation of this section". 7
Counsel for the Water Board believes that this ordinance is in
violation of the Charter since, according to the Board's theory,
the City Council has no legislative authority whatsoever in matters concerning the water system.
If the Water Board has all the powers of the city which it
might. use in conducting its water operations, it must have the
power to levy a general property tax for the purpose of building
a new pumping plant. The power to tax is given Denver both in
Article XX of the Constitution 8 and in the Charter.0 It is difficult to believe that either the Council which drafted the amendment creating the Board or the people of Denver who voted on
the amendment intended that the Board should have the power
to tax. It is equally difficult to imagine the Supreme Court upholding a tax levied by the Board.
The extent of the Board's power has never been litigated. 10
The only other penalty regulation made or exercised by the Board
concerns a "stolen connection"-the failure of a plumber to report
the installation of a plumbing fixture. The penalty has been assessed "two or three times"; once for $300.11
It should be noted here that the Board's penalty regulation,
concerning misuse of water, terms the penalty a "special charge".
The theory of the Board is that since it has no way of knowing
how much extra water is being used through the violation, it is
justified in its estimates of $5, $25, and $100 as compensation for
the extra use. 12 It would be difficult for the Board to persuade
a court that a person who was discovered on ten occasions within
a year irrigating after hours might conceivably have used $730
worth of water beyond the amount permitted by the regulations.
This is not a special charge; it is a penalty:
A penalty is a sum of money exacted by way of
punishment for doing some act which is prohibited, or
omitting to do some thing which is required to be done.13
The special charge theory is especially weak when measured
by the Charter requirement that, "all water rates shall be uniform
14
as far as practicable and as low as good service will permit".
Mr. Sanders asserted that even if the special charge were
held to be a penalty, the regulation is valid because the Water
Board has the power to penalize.
It is submitted that the Charter does not give the Water
Board general legislative power in its operation of the water department: that the Board is an agency of the people of Denver
'Munic. Ordinances of Denver, § 850.13.
§6 g.
'Art. XIII, § 190.
"Conference with Mr. Saunders.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
"31 Words and Phrases 635.
' Charter Art. XIX, § 297B.
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with specific authority to operate a water system (as a municipal
utility) 15 and in doing so, to exercise the quasi-legislative functions of fixing rates and providing rules and regulations. The
Water Board is an administrative agency of and directly responsible to the people of Denver.
PENALIZING POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Ordinarily administrative agencies are created by the legislature. The Board of Water Commissioners was created by the people of Denver in whom the legislative power was vested by the
Constitution. Therefore, in the discussion which follows we must
think of the people of Denver as occupying the same position as
the various legislatures discussed in the cases.
Administrative authorities may be empowered to enact rules and regulations having the force and effect of
law, but any criminal or penal sanction for the violation
of such rules and regulations must come from the legislature itself. Administrative authorities may not initiate
such sanctions. 16
In the case of United States v. Eaton,17 the Supreme Court
held that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue could not impose
a penalty (which it was authorized to impose for violation of a
law) for the violation of a regulation which the statute did not
specifically give the status of law. The case has been criticized
for its possibly too fine distinction as to what the legislature meant
to be "law", but its importance here is in that it illustrates the fact
that if the legislature does not authorize a penalty for violation
of an administrative agency's rules and regulations, the agency
cannot exercise legislative power and initiate its own penalty.
Without statutory authorization, a California board of education, pursuant to its regulation, reduced the salary of a teacher
until such time as she should acquire additional college credits.8
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Rible v. Hughes,
stated that the board was "powerless to impose penalties, a purely
legislative power"; and further, that the board was a quasi-municipal corporation with only limited powers which could not be exceeded. 19
In the case of Commonwealth v. Diaz, 20 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts reviewed the penalizing powers of administrative agencies and concluded:
15Englewood v. Denver, 123 Colo. 290.
42 Am. Jur. 355.
144 U. S. 677.
140 P. 2d 181, 184.
"This case was later reversed, 150 P. 2d 455; the Court decided that there
was no penalty involved, that the board's regulations "merely provide that a
teacher is to be compensated in accordance with training and experience."
20326 Mass. 525, 95 N.E. 2d 666, 669.
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• . . Thus it would appear that the practice of authorizing a municipality or board to fix penalties within definite limits is one of long standing in this Commonwealth
and we know of no case decided by this court where it
has been held to be objectionable ...
...
The authority which may be granted to a local governing body to fix penalties, even when a maximum limit
is prescribed, is not unrestricted. Such bodies cannot
be granted a roving commission to establish within broad
limits such penalties as they see fit. That is essentially
a legislative power which cannot be delegated.
It will be noted that underlying the Court's discussion here is
the basic principle that unless authority to penalize is specifically
given by the legislature, the agency has no such authority. The
problem discussed by the Court was, assuming authority is given,
how limited must it be in order to be a constitutional delegation
of authority.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act restates the law
pertaining to sanctions.2 1 "In the exercise of any power or authority-No sanction shall be imposed or substantive rule or order
be issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and
as authorized by law."
While the Model State Administrative Procedure Act does
not contain a section dealing expressly with sanctions, Section
6 (2) reads, "The court shall declare the rule invalid if it finds
that it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory
authority of the agency . . . " Thus under the uniform state act,
a rule or regulation imposing a penalty would be held invalid
where the legislature did not authorize sanctions.
WAYS IN WHICH THE LEGISLATURE MAY INITIATE SANCTIONS
WHEN CREATING AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

A common provision for sanctions, in statutes creating administrative agencies, sets out both the law and the penalty for
its violation and authorizes the agency to determine when the
law has been violated. The statute may authorize the agency to
impose the penalty or it may leave that function with the executive and judiciary branches.
One of the many cases illustrating this method is the case of
Lloyd Sabando Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, Collector
of Customs.2 2 The Immigration Act of 1917 and 1924, made it unlawful to transport to the United States certain classes of aliens
and empowered the Secretary of Labor to determine the fitness
of aliens and collect a $1,000 penalty for violation of the Act. The
United States Supreme Court said:
9 (a).
S287 U. S. 329.

"§
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Under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
control of admission of aliens is committed exclusively
to Congress and, in the exercise of that control it may
lawfully impose appropriate obligations, sanction their
enforcement by reasonable money penalties, and invest
in administrative officials the power to impose and enforce them.
Another instance of this method of penalizing is found in the
federal revenue laws:
Section 293 (b) of the revenue act of 1928 provided,
"If any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade
tax, then 50 per centum of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be so assessed, collected and paid . . . " 23
A second way in which the legislature may initiate a penalty
is by setting out the penalty for violation of rules and regulations
which the statute authorizes the agency to make. Here again the
statute will authorize either the agency or the courts to impose
the penalty.
Illustrating this method is the case of Singer v. United
States 24 which involved the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940. Referring to the Eaton case, supra, the United States
Supreme Court said:
(The Court) reasoned that since Congress had prescribed penalties for certain acts but not for failure to
keep books the omission could not be supplied by regulation . . . The situation here is quite different. Section 11
of the present act makes it a crime to do specified acts,
either by way of omission or commission, in violation of
the Act or the rules and regulations issued under it.
Another case which illustrates this method is United States
v. Grimaud.25 The Supreme Court upheld a statute which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to:
. . . make provision for the protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests
and forest reservations ... ; and he may make such rules
and regulations and establish such service as will insure
the objects of such reservation . . . ; and any violation
of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations
shall be punished (by a) fine of not more than $500 and
imprisonment for not more than 12 months or both, at
the discretion of the court.
24

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391.
323 U. S. 338, 345.
220 U. S. 506, 509.
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must be within the scope of the adminThe rules and regulations
26
istrator's authority.
The third method by which the legislature initiates sanctions
is by authorizing the agency to provide penalty regulations, within
limits, for the violation of the rules and regulations which it is
authorized to make. This method has been attacked as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.27 While "the cases exhibit a tendency to invalidate penalty regulations", s5 an important
exception to the general rule is the "penalty-declaring power
(given) to bodies having a limited geographical jurisdiction. In
this class fall municipalities, an appointive local board, and subdelegations to administrators through municipalities. While it is
possible that express constitutional authority exists for such delegations, historical grounds plus expediency are their real justification." 29 It will be noted that the Board of Water Commissioners would fall within the above exception. The argument in this
paper is not that the people could not have given the Water Board
the authority to penalize but that they did not.
An example of the authority to make penal regulations is the
authority given to the Water Board to penalize for3 0 violation of
its regulations pertaining to payment of water bills.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Diaz,31 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts upheld a statute authorizing the Commissioner
of Airport Management to:
...make such rules and regulations, subject to the approval of the board, for the use, operation, and maintenance of state-owned airports as he may from time to
time deem reasonable and expedient, which may provide
penalties for the violation of said rules and regulations
not exceeding five hundred dollars for any one offense.
In another case,32 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld a congressional statute-the District of Columbia Traffic Act-which authorized the Director of Traffic to make
reasonable traffic regulations and prescribe penalties, within limits,
of fine or imprisonment.
CONCLUSION

The Water Board's regulation providing for special charges for
"a use of water contrary to the rules and regulations" is unenforceable because the Board has no authority to make penalty
regulations.
Id. at 511; Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 241.
"Board of Harbor Commissioners of Port of Eureka 'v. Excelsior Redwood
Co. 26 P. 375.
"Adinistrative Penalty Regulations, 43 COL. LAW REv. 213.
2

nIbid.

30Charter Art. XIX, § 297B.
3 326 Mass. 525, 95 N.E. 2d 666, 667.
"Smallwood v. D. C., 17 F. 2d 210.
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The Water Board's misapprehension of its authority stems
from two sources. First, realizing that the Charter could have given
the Board legislative power-which of course a legislature could
not do-the Board too readily concludes that it has done so. Second, because of its preconceived belief that it has legislative power,
the Board misinterprets the Charter, attaching no significance to
the words, "in the matter of".
The Board is by Charter given authority to acquire, conduct
and operate a water system and everything incidental thereto, and
to make rules and regulations for the use and distribution of
water. This cannot be considered a grant of general legislative
power. It is a grant of authority similar to that in the Diaz case,
supra, given to the Commissioner of Airport Management. The
Water Board is an administrative agency of the people of Denver-no more.
Being an administrative agency, we must look to the case
law to determine whether the Board has authority to make penalty
regulations. From the cases we learn that unless an agency is
specifically given authority to make penalty regulations, it cannot do so.
With the exception of penalizing for late payment or nonpayment of water bills, the Charter gives the Water Board no
authority to make penalty regulations. Therefore, it would seem
that the penalty regulation of June 24th is invalid.

THE POWER OF THE DENVER WATER BOARD
TO ENACT PENALTY REGULATIONS
LEE HAMBY*

On June 24, 1954, the Board of Water Commissioners of the
City and County of Denver supplemented their rules and regulations with the following rule, set forth below in full:
Whenever the management shall discover a use of
water contrary to the rules and regulations of the Board,
a notice of such misuse shall be given to the occupant of
the premises where the misuse occurs informing the occupant of the time and type of misuse. Whenever during
a calendar year a second occurrence of misuse shall be
found at any premises, a special charge of five dollars
($5.00) shall be imposed upon those premises without
regard to whether or not the second misuse was of the
same or a different character than the first. Notice of
such charge shall be given to the occupant at the time of
such second misuse. In case of a third misuse during
the same calendar year, a similar procedure shall be followed but the special charge shall be twenty-five dollars
Student, University of Denver College of Law.

